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Migration, Money and Mother: 
The Effect of Migration on Children’s Educational Performance in Rural China 
Abstract 
Migration is widely known as one of the main ways of alleviating poverty in developing 
countries, including China. However, migration itself is not costless. In recent years, there is an 
emerging concern about the effect of migration on the educational achievement of the children of 
migrants in China since most of the young children of school age of the migrants are being left in 
the village when one or both of their parents move to the city to work. This paper examines the 
effect of the migration activities of the father and/or mother on the educational performance of 
elementary school students (First to Fifth grade). With a dataset that collected from a survey 
designed specifically to examine changes in school performance of children before and after 
their parents left the village to migrate to the city we use Difference-in-Difference and, 
propensity score matching approaches. Although the grades of the children from some migrants 
family are sometimes lower than those from non-migrants family (in the time period before and 
after migration), somewhat surprisingly, we find that there is no significant negative effect of 
migration itself on the children’s school performance. In fact, in some cases (e.g., after the father 
migrates), performance improves. Our paper also demonstrates and explains the interaction 
effects of migration from wealth and household composition.  
JEL: O12, O15   
Keywords: migration; educational performance; household composition; rural China 
 
  2Migration, Money and Mother: 
The Effect of Migration on Children’s Educational Performance in Rural China 
 
Migration is widely known by economists and policy makers as one of the main ways of 
alleviating poverty in developing countries (Todaro, 1985). There are many positive effects. 
Having a migrant may increase a household’s income per capita significantly (Du and Park, 
2006). Migrant income helps reduce inequality (Benjamin et al., 2005). Increases in out-
migration lead to investment in assets related to agricultural production (deBrauw and Giles, 
2005). 
Migration itself, however, is not costless. In recent years there is an emerging concern 
internationally about the effect of migration on the educational achievement of the children of 
migrants (Kandel and Kao, 2001; Edwards and Ureta, 2003; Cordoba, 2004; Yang, 2005; Hanson 
and Woodruff, 2003; McKenzie and Rapoport, 2005). In the first wave of migration in a country, 
many new migrants leave their children in the countryside in the care of others (Wu et al., 2004). 
If parental absence as a result of migration translates into less parental input into the education 
acquisition process, a migrant household may find that the educational attainment of its children 
is depressed (McKenzie et al., 2006). 
As in the rest of the world, this is an important and emerging issue in China. It is well 
documented now that migration is rising fast, surpassing 100 million individuals (deBrauw et al., 
2002). Migrants also are moving further away from home and leaving for a longer period of time 
(Rozelle et al., 1999). Since most of China’s migration is by individuals instead of entire 
households, in most cases the school-aged children of the migrant parents are being left in the 
village when their fathers, mothers or both parents move to the city for work. Several researchers 
have claimed—albeit without any empirical backing—that school performance of the migrant 
  3children is being adversely affected (Wang and Wu, 2003; Tan and Wang, 2004; Li, 2004; Zhou 
and Wu, 2004). 
If it is found that there is such an adverse effect and that the cost is high, the government 
may want to respond. For example, it might be possible to allocate funds to build boarding 
schools, implement mentoring programs, provide students with closer monitoring (e.g., through 
smaller class sizes) and/or build more schools in urban areas that welcome the children of 
migrants. Or the government could start to modify the educational policy to favor children of 
migrant households (Heckman, 2005). However, all of these will be expensive and these 
programs themselves will have costs.  
On the other hand, if the costs that may be caused by the negative impacts of migration 
on the education attainment of the children of migrants are not that high—and there are several 
reasons to believe they may not be—then it may be that policy makers can avoid spending time 
and effort in producing a costly response (and use their freed up resources in other more needy 
areas). It may be that the children of migrant households are not hurt performance-wise when 
one or both of their parents leave. It could be that the children of migrant households perform 
more poorly, not because their parents leave, but that their grades were systematically lower to 
start with (Ye et al., 2006). In fact, because school performance may be tied to income (Blau, 
1999; Korenman et al., 1995; Duncan et al., 1994; Hanushek, 1992; Wolfe; 1981) and migration 
may generate higher incomes (Du and Park, 2006), it could be that the children of migrants 
benefit due to the income effect from migration. In addition, there may be other effects that are 
masking the true relationship as well. Somewhat surprisingly, little work has been done to 
understand whether or not migration hurts the educational performance of children. 
  4The overall goal of this paper is to examine the effect of migration activities of men and 
women on the educational performance of their children. It is possible that a better understanding 
will provide policy makers with the information they need to make (or not make) changes to the 
school system and childcare systems in China’s rural and urban areas. To meet this goal, we will 
pursue three specific objectives. First, we compare the distribution of children’s scores for 
different types of rural households—looking at the grades of the boys and girls from the migrant 
households and non-migrant households and describe how the grades vary over time. Second, we 
examine whether migration negatively affects the school grades of rural children. Third, we 
explore how migration will affect children’s educational performance in different types of 
households, households that differ in terms of wealth or demographic composition.  
To meet these objectives, we will rely on a set of data that we collected in 2006, a data 
collection effort that was designed specifically to examine changes in school performance of 
children before and after their parents left the village to migrate to the city. With this data set, we 
focus our attention on two types of households: the migrant households and the non-migrant 
households. The non-migrant households are those in which neither parent migrated during the 
study period. We divide migrant households into six types of households, the categories of which 
are defined to reflect who outmigrated (father and/or mother). Using these different subsets of 
groups of households, we compare the grade distributions and changes in grade distributions 
using non-parametric analysis. The descriptive analysis is supplemented by a more rigorous 
multivariate analysis on the determinants of children’s educational performance using several 
approaches, including a Difference-in-Difference approach (DD), propensity score matching 
(PSM) and a combination of these two approaches (DDM). Finally, by using interaction terms in 
our DD framework we are able to understand if there is a greater, lesser or equal effect of 
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different numbers of siblings. 
This study is unique in several respects. First, it contributes to the limited understanding 
of the effects of migration on rural human capital investment by examining how children's 
grades correspond to the migration decisions of their parents. To date the literature on migration 
and human capital investment in origin communities is relatively small and is focused largely on 
the impact of migration on educational attainment (see, for example, Edwards and Ureta, 2003; 
Cordoba, 2004; Yang, 2005; Hanson and Woodruff, 2003; McKenzie and Rapoport, 2005). 
Second, our paper utilizes panel data from a survey designed specifically to examine changes in 
school achievement of children before and after their parents left the village to migrate to the city, 
a strategy that will help to eliminate some of the statistical problems that are associated with this 
type of analysis. Most of current research in China only uses cross sectional data. Third, we try 
to use the most up-to-date evaluation methods, instead of the more traditional OLS approaches.  
There are limitations, however, in our approach. For example, we focus on students and 
their families from one small, poor part of China, a fact that limits our ability to say anything 
about China in general. In addition, since we sample from the population of children that made it 
to the sixth grade in rural schools, we ignore those that drop out and/or those that accompanied 
their parents to the city. According to information from the school sections of our survey work, 
the drop out rate in our sample is low. More than 98 percent of the children that started first 
grade were still in school in the sixth grade.  
Data 
The data used in this paper come from a survey executed by the authors in 2006. While 
the survey in part relied on recall data—especially for some of the control variables—we were 
  6able to use records and rely on multiple sources of information for our two key variables—
grades of school achievement and migration status.  
The sample was drawn from 36 primary schools in 12 towns in Shaanxi province, one of 
the nation’s poorest provinces in northwest China. The sample was drawn using a multi-stage, 
clustering design with random selection procedures employed at each stage. In the first stage, six 
counties were selected from 93 counties in Shaanxi province. In the second stage, the survey 
team randomly selected two townships in each county. The two townships were chosen from a 
list of all townships in the county that were ranked according to per capita income. One township 
was chosen from relatively rich townships and the other from relatively poor townships. In stage 
three, a list of all primary schools was created in each township (where schools were limited to 
all primary schools that included six years of schooling—or all wanxiao). From this list three 
primary schools were chosen randomly.  
The sample students were selected during the final stage of the sampling. The sample 
included all students that were in the entering year of the sixth grade classes in each of the 
sample schools. On average, there were 1.4 sixth grade classes per school, ranging from one to 
three. Being done in September, the students had just begun a new school year. Therefore, all of 
the sample students had just completed the fifth grade about two months previously (as the 
school year in China runs between early September and mid-July). In total, the sample included 
1649 children and their families. Approximately 45 percent of sample students were girls. The 
ages of the students ranged between 10 and 16.  
We also elicited information about the students from their homeroom teacher (or 
banzhuren). In more than 90 percent of the cases, the homeroom teacher had been with the 
students in his/her homeroom class for at least two years. In China the homeroom teacher not 
  7only teaches the children one or two subjects, he/she also is in charge of administering each 
student’s school program and is the interface between the students and the principal’s office and 
the students and their parents. Many homeroom teachers make a point of visiting the homes of 
their students. Therefore, in most cases the homeroom teach was intimately familiar with the 
school performance and family life of each student.   
Our main measure of education achievement is based on the math and Chinese language 
scores of the students from 2001/2 (their first grade year) to 2005/6 (their fifth grade year).
1 
Fortunately, in China every student in most every elementary school (including, at least, all of 
the schools in our sample) keeps in his/her possession a booklet that contains a comprehensive 
record of the math and Chinese scores for each semester of his/her schooling. This means that the 
school performance variables that we use in our analysis are record-based. In other words, the 
information on school achievement is not from recall, but is from each student’s grade booklet. 
The grades were copied by our enumerators with the assistance of the homeroom teachers.  
In this paper, we focus on second term (or spring semester) math and Chinese language 
scores because the scores for these classes are based on a single yearend test that is standardized. 
The exams are standardized in two dimensions. First, the questions are the same for all students 
within the schools in the same township. Second, the final exams were graded according to a 
single set of criteria by a township-wide panel of teachers.  
In our analysis, we also primarily look at changes between the second term scores from 
the first and fifth grades. To check the sensitivity of this assumption, we also performed a great 
deal of sensitivity analysis. For example, we used average grades for the whole year instead of 
just for the second semester. In another alternative, we compared scores that averaged scores 
  8from first AND second grade from scores that averaged scores from fourth and the fifth grade. In 
each of these cases there were no substantive differences in our findings. 
We also collected detailed information on the migration histories of each of the families. 
The first set of information came from the survey form that was collected from the students and 
their family. A form was filled out that asked for the migration status of each parent during the 
first grade and the migration status of each parent during the fifth grade. If the parents were both 
out of the village, in about 95 percent of the times were called one of the parents and asked them 
over the telephone. The homeroom teacher then was asked to verify the information. If there was 
any question about the validity of the information on the survey form, we attempted to reconcile 
the information by making a follow up query of the family. If the homeroom teacher was not 
present during the first grade, we consulted the personnel in the office and consulted information 
on the attendance of parents at parent-teacher meetings that are held during each term as a way 
of cross checking the information on migration status.  
In this study we will focus on two types of households: Migrant households (or those 
households in which at least one parent outmigrated in 2002 and 2006) and non-migrant 
households. Recognizing that the effect of migration on student performance may be affected by 
who in the household outmigrates (that is, father/mother/both), we subdivided the Migrant 
households into six types of households: Any Parent Migrated households (that is, households in 
which both parents lived at home in 2002 and at least one parent –either the father; mother or 
both parents—outmigrated in 2006); Father Migrated Only (or mother-stayed-at-home) 
households where only the father outmigrated in 2006 but was at home in 2002; Father Migrated 
(Unconditional ) households where the father was at home in 2002 but outmigrated in 2006 
(including households in which the mother was either at home or not at home in 2006); Mother 
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2006 but was at home in 2002; Mother Migrated (Unconditional) households where the mother 
was at home in 2002 but outmigrated in 2006 (including households in which the father was 
either at home or not at home in 2006); and Both Parents Migrated households where both 
parents were at home in 2002, but outmigrated in 2006. For brevity, when we talk about all of 
these households as a group, we call them New Migrant households to distinguish them from 
households that were already in the migrant labor force in 2002, households which are ignored in 
our study. In addition, for the non-migrant households, we define Never Migrant households as 
those where both parents stayed at home in both 2002 and 2006. 
In addition to school performance and migration, a set of other questions were asked 
during the survey as control variables and which are used to create variables that can explore the 
heterogeneous effects of migration on school performance.
2 Specifically, as family wealth may 
improve the learning outcomes of students (Brown and Park, 2002), we asked the parents if their 
house was worth more than 5000 yuan or not as a proxy for their family’s wealth.
3 Although this 
is a crude measure of wealth, we discovered that such a question is typically measured with 
fairly small error and eliminated the need to implement a long questionnaire to collect 
comprehensive information on income, assets and/or consumption. Finally, since many studies 
have also documented the effect of the number of children in a family and the scholastic 
performance of each child (Hanushek, 1992; Nuttall, 1976; Steelman and Mercy, 1980), we 
collected information on whether a student had any siblings or not. 
Migration and Educational Performance 
Similar to many rural regions in poor areas of China (see for example, Rozelle et al., 
1999), many households in our sample were in the migrant labor force in 2002, the first year of 
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grade in 2006), at least one parent outmigrated in 236 households, or from about 15 percent of 
total households (Table 1, column 1). Of the 236 households, only the father outmigrated in 149 
households, only the mother outmigrated in 18 households and both parents outmigrated in 69 
households.
4  
Also similar to the rest of China (as reported in deBrauw et al., 2002), the number of 
new migrant households rose fast during the study period. Of the 1,358 households that were not 
outmigrating in 2002 (column 1, row 4), at least one of the parents in 220 of these households 
entered the migrant labor force between 2002 and 2006 (row 4, column 2 – 4). After accounting 
for the 2002 migrant households that returned to the village (there were 81 such households—
55+9+17— row 1 – 3, column 5), in 2006 at least one parent in 24 percent of the sample 
households (or 232+49+94=375/1594, row 5, column 2 – 4) was in the migrant labor force. Of 
all of the households, 1,138 were Never Migrant households. In the rest of the analysis—both 
descriptive and multivariate—our main comparisons will focus on the grade performance of the 
children of the 1138 Never Migrant households and those of the 220 New Migrant households.   
If one were naively to visit rural areas and search out migrant parents (especially those 
households in which both parents outmigrated) and ask them the record of their child’s school 
performance, it is possible to understand how the findings of such an inquiry could raise 
concerns about the impact of migration on school performance. In such an interview, one would 
likely have found that the grades of the fifth grade student of the New Migrant household would 
have fallen since the first grade. However, such an interpretation may not be an indication of a 
problem that can be blamed on migration. As our data show, it is not only the grades of the 
students of the New Migrant households that fell, but also the average grades of all children fell. 
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different. When asking teachers about this trend we were told the pattern of falling grades is easy 
to explain for both New Migrant and Never Migrant households: Fifth grade teachers grade a bit 
harder than first grade teachers and teach a more rigorous curriculum. As seen in Figure 1, this is 
true for both Math and Chinese classes. 
If the interviewers had sought out households in which either both parents outmigrated 
or households in which only the mother outmigrated, the results of interviewing these households 
may have been an alternative source of concern about the effect of migration on the grades of the 
children of new migrants. As in the findings of a number of research teams (for example, Wang 
and Wu, 2003; Tan and Wang, 2004; Li, 2004; Zhou and Wu, 2004 ), in our sample the students 
of Both Parents Migrated households on average had lower average test scores during their fifth 
grade year than those from Never Migrant households (Figure 2). Although the difference is not 
statistically significant, the grades of the children of Only Mother Migrated households in 2006 
were also lower than those of Never Migrants. While we will explore this result further in the 
analysis below, it may be that it is these types of findings, which appear in our 2006 data of a 
cross section of fifth grade households that has made the effect of migration on school 
achievement a high profile issue. Interestingly, if the interview team had chosen a Only Father 
Migrated household, they would have found that on average the grades of their children were 
slightly higher than those of Never Migrant households. Differences among different types of 
households are one part of the evidence that should caution those that are relying exclusively on 
cross sectional data that the issue of the effect of migration on school performance may be 
complicated and that care needs to be exercised in any interpretation.  
  12The need to exercise caution is reinforced when comparing the distributions of scores 
and the changes in the distributions of scores from 2002 to 2006 between the students from Both 
Parents Migrated households and Never Migrant households (Figure 3). Although the scores of 
fifth grade students from Both Parents Migrated households scored lower than those from the 
Never Migrant households in 2006, they also scored lower in 2002 when the students were in the 
first grade. In other words, at least on average (and without holding other things constant) the 
grades of the students were already low in Both Parents Migrate households before the parents 
migrated. In fact, although it is difficult to tell definitively, by just reexamining Figure 3, one 
might actually infer that migration helps, and not hurts grades because it appears as if the gap 
between the scores of migrant children and non-migrant children actually was narrowing slightly 
between 2002 and 2006. Importantly, although there are differences in the point estimates in 
2002 and 2006 between new migrants and never migrants, t-tests of the differences between the 
distributions in the panels for 2002 and 2006 in Figure 3 show that the means of the two 
distributions in each year are not statistically significant. 
Further analysis of our data reveals that the determinants of school performance are 
complex and there are many factors that may explain why some students perform better than 
others. In other words, the fact that many other things are changing over time and differ between 
migrant children and non-migrant children may be masking the relationship between migration 
and grades. For example, as seen in Figure 1, grades change over time. In addition, grades differ 
by the amount of wealth—or more specifically, the value of the housing assets of the household.
5 
Students from wealthier households score systematically higher than those from the poorer 
households (Figure 4, Panel A). This relationship in our data, in fact, is consistent with those 
found by others that have found that the grades of children from better off families often are 
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studying facilities, including access to extra reading materials and exercise books (Princiotta et 
al., 2006). And the students from wealthier households also may have less housework to do as 
well so that they may spend more time on their study, which might also lead to higher scores 
than their less wealthy counterparts who may be asked to help out more around the house as 
families try to scratch out a living.  
In addition, grades differ among households with different household demographic 
compositions. Students from the households in which there are no siblings scored slightly lower 
than those from the households with siblings in 2006 (Figure 4, Panel B). Such a finding is 
consistent with Brown and Park’s study (2002), which found that children with older siblings 
have significantly higher test scores than their peers. It is possible that the grades of these 
children are higher because students without any siblings are unable to receive help from their 
siblings or because they have no siblings that they can share the burdens of household duties 
together.
6 If either a household’s wealth or demographic composition differs systematically with 
a household’s migration status—which is plausible—simple correlations between a family’s 
migration status and the grades of its children could be misleading. For example, Giles and 
deBrauw (2006) find that migrant households, while poorer, improve their family’s income status 
after migration. The change of income could have a positive effect on the grades of migrant 
children over time that might offset any other adverse impact. Therefore, further analysis needs 
to explore the impacts of migration on educational achievement while holding as many other 
factors constant as possible.  
  14Methodology 
The objective of this study is to examine the effects of the migration activities of parents 
on children’s educational performance. In order to evaluate the effects of migration, migration is 
considered as the treatment and our sample households are divided into a treatment group and a 
control group. The treatment group includes all the New Migrant households. The control group 
includes all the Never Migrant households. With this set up, we are interested in understanding 
the mean impact of “treatment on the treated” which is the average impact of migration among 
those treated (Smith and Todd, 2005): 
() ( ) ( ) 10 1 0 ( ) |, 1 |, 1 |, 1 TT E Y Y X D E Y X D E Y X D =− = = = − =               (1) 
where we denote Y1 as the outcome (student grade in our case) if the student is from New 
Migrant households, Y0 as the outcome if a student is from Never Migrant households, D=1 
stands for the group of households who migrated in 2006 for whom Y1 is observed, D=0 stands 
for those who did not migrated in 2006 for whom Y0 is observed. In reality we do not observe the 
counterfactual mean, ( ) 0 |, 1 EY XD = , or the mean outcome for the migrating households had 
they not migrated in 2006. Therefore, we employ a difference-in-difference method (DD) to 
compare the outcomes before and after a migration status change for households affected by the 
change (children in New Migrant households) to households not affected by the change (those 
from Never Migrant households).
7 In equation (1) Let t and t' denote time periods after (2006) 
and before (2002) the change of migration status. The standard DD estimate is given by: 
[ ] [ ] (| 1 ) (| 1 ) (| 0 ) (| 0 ) tt t t D D E YD E YD E YD E YD ′′ = = −= −= −=           (2) 
The idea of using a DD estimator to produce DD estimates is that it allows us to correct 
the simple differences before and after for the treatment group (or New Migrant households) by 
subtracting the simple difference for the control group (Never Migrant households). By 
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groups, any common trends, which will show up in the outcomes of the control groups as well as 
the treated groups, get differenced out (Smith 2004).  
In addition to the standard DD estimator, we implement three other DD estimators: an 
“unrestricted” version that includes Yt' as a right hand variable, an “adjusted” version that 
includes other covariates in addition to the treatment variable (in our case they are a series of 
control variables from 2002 or the pre-program period), and an unrestricted/adjusted model that 
combines the features of both the “unrestricted” and “adjusted” model. The unrestricted and 
adjusted DD estimators relax the implicit restrictions in the standard DD estimator that the 
coefficient associated with Yt' (pre-program outcome) and covariates in t' (pre-program period) 
equals one. The combination of unrestricted and adjusted DD estimators relaxes both of these 
assumptions. In summary, the models to be estimated are: 
Model (1), Restricted & Unadjusted: ΔScorei = α + δMIGi + εi
Model (2), Unrestricted  & Unadjusted: ΔScorei = α +δMIGi +γScore_02i + εi
Model (3), Restricted & Adjusted: ΔScorei = α +δMIGi +βXi + εi, 
Model (4), Unrestricted & Adjusted: ΔScorei = α +δMIGi +γScore_02i +βXi + εi
where, i is an index for the student, ΔScorei is the change of the second term score of student i 
between 2002 and 2006 (that is the final grade from the fifth grade minus the final grade from 
the first grade); MIGi is the treatment variable (which makes δ the parameter of interest). In our 
analysis, we have six different treatments, namely: Any Parent Migrated households; Father 
Migrated Only households; Father Migrated (unconditional) households; Mother Migrated Only 
households; Mother Migrated (unconditional) households; and Both Parents Migrated 
households and estimate six different δ’s. Finally, the term Xi is a vector of covariates that are 
  16included to capture the characteristics of students, parents and households. Throughout our 
analysis, Xi also includes a set of 12 town indicator or dummy variables. 
It is important to remember that the identification of the causal effects using DD relies 
on the assumption that absent the policy change (or migration in our case), the average change in 
 would have been the same for the treated and the control groups. Formally, this is called 
the “parallel trend” assumption, which can be expressed as:  
t YY ′ − t
) 0, 0, 0, 0, (| 1 ) (| 1 ) (| 0 ) (| 0 tt t t E YD E YD E YD E YD ′′ =− == =− =                   (3)  
As might be expected, the effectiveness of DD depends on the validity of this assumption. 
Whether or not the assumption is valid, however, depends on the context of the study and on how 
similar the control and treatment groups are. In general, the more similar are the treatment and 
control groups, the more convincing the DD approach. Using our data we find that Never 
Migrant households (the control group) and Any Parent Migrated households (one of the 
treatment groups) are not significantly different in most respects in 2002 (Appendix A). This 
finding suggests that the parallel trend assumption may hold.  
Alternative Estimation Approaches 
Unfortunately, the reality of our question (understanding the effect of migration on the grades of 
children) may mean that even though we control for a large number of observable variables in 
2002 in the adjusted and unrestricted versions of the DD estimates, there could be other 
unobservable factors that may compromise the parallel trend assumption. Because of the 
potential existence of other differences between Never Migrant and New Migrant households, we 
also use a series of propensity score matching methods (PSM) that is an approach that does not 
require the parallel trend assumption. PSM allows the analyst to match the treated and the 
controls when observable characteristics of Never Migrant and New Migrant households are 
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variables (Rosenbaum et al. 1985) With the right data, it is possible to estimate the propensity 
scores of all households and compare the outcomes of non-migrant and migrant households that 
have similar propensity scores.
8 We can obtain the mean impact of the treatment on the treated 
by (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002; Smith and Todd, 2005): 
{ } 10 1 | 1 0 (| 1 ) ( | 1 ) ( | ( ) , 0 ZD EY Y D EY D E EY pZ D = −= = = − = )           (4)
where is the propensity score. Matching is based on the assumption that 
outcomes (Y
() P r ( 1 |) pZ D Z ≡=
0, which is student grades in our case) are independent of participation (migration) 
conditional on a set of observable characteristics (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). So we do not 
need to worry about unobservable heterogeneity. By matching New Migrant households with 
Never Migrant households with similar values ofPr( 1| ) DZ = , any differences in between 
the two groups are assumed to be differenced out when calculating the above equation. The 
assumption of matching is that 
0 () EY
00 (|, 1 ) (|, 0 ) EY ZD EY ZD = == . The observable covariates Z 
should include the characteristics that determine migration. In our analyses, Z  includes a 
number of variables including student, parent and household characteristics. We also include 
township fixed effects to control for unobservable factors at the township level that may affect 
migration. 
To implement PSM successfully, however, the nature of the samples of New Migrant and 
Never Migrated households in 2006 must meet certain criteria and several other choices must be 
made. Importantly, the common support of the propensity scores for participating and non-
participating households should be fairly wide. Intuitively, wide common support means that 
there must be a fairly large overlap in the propensity scores between the treated and control 
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9. This means that we can estimate the 
average treatment effect for the treated of a large portion of the sample. 
Once we determine that PSM is feasible, we next need to choose the method of matching. 
In our analysis, we choose to use the nearest neighbor matching method with replacement. 
Following Smith and Todd (2005), we match on the log odds-ratio and standard errors are 
bootstrapped using 1000 replications. We also use a balancing test that follows Dehijia and 
Wahba (1999, 2002) that is satisfied for all covariates. The results of the balancing tests are 
available upon request.  
While PSM is often used in program evaluations, it relies on a key underlying 
assumption: outcomes are independent of migration conditional on a set of observable 
characteristics. Formally, this assumption can be written as: 
00 (|( ) , 1 ) (|( ) , 0 ) EY PZ D EY PZ D == =                               (5) 
In other words, there would be no need to worry about unobservable heterogeneity. However, 
even though we control for unobservable differences at the township level using fixed effects 
when estimating the propensity score, there may still be systematic differences between the 
outcomes of Migrant and Never Migrated households. The systematic differences could arise, for 
example, because the household’s decision to migrate is based on some unmeasured household 
characteristics. Such differences could violate the identification conditions required for matching 
(Smith and Todd, 2005).  
To eliminate the bias due to time-invariant unobservable differences between New 
Migrant and Never Migrant households, we extend the cross-sectional PSM approach to a 
longitudinal setting and implement a difference-in-differences matching (DDM) strategy. With 
DDM we can exploit the data on the Migrant households in 2002 to construct the required 
  19counterfactual, instead of just using the data in 2006 (as is used in the PSM analysis). The 
advantage of DDM is that the assumptions that justify DDM estimation are weaker than the 
assumptions necessary for DD or the conventional PSM estimator. DDM only requires that in the 
absence of treatment, the average outcomes for treated and controls would have followed parallel 
paths:   
) 0 ), ( | ( ) 0 ), ( | ( ) 1 ), ( | ( ) 1 ), ( | ( ' ' , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 = − = = = − = D Z P Y E D Z P Y E D Z P Y E D Z P Y E
t t t t   (6) 
Assumptions embedded in equation (6) are weaker than the assumptions necessary for DD. 
Intuitively, DDM removes time invariant unobservable differences between New Migrant and 
Never Migrant households conditional on P(Z), a clear advantage over cross-sectional PSM.
10  
In performing DDM we match by using the log odds-ratios and the same nearest 
neighbor matching methods with replacement that were used in our PSM approach (which were 
described above). In addition, we also compute the “adjusted” version where the control units are 
weighted by the number of times that they are matched to a treated unit. The standard errors also 
are bootstrapped using 1000 replications. 
Although the above matching methods can significantly improve the reliability of 
matching estimators, producing results that have been shown to be very close to those based on a 
randomized design (Smith and Todd, 2005; Abadie and Imbens, 2006). Smith and Todd (2005) 
counsel that geographic mismatch between matched observations should be avoided. In our case, 
when we use PSM, even if we have added a set of township dummies when estimating the 
propensity scores, students that are from different townships but have similar propensity scores 
may still be matched as a pair of treatment and control observations. Abadie and Imbens (2006) 
propose a method to eliminate bias caused by imprecise matching of covariates between 
treatment and control observations using nearest neighbor matching. They also developed a 
  20formula to estimate standard errors for matching with a fixed number of nearest neighbors that 
are asymptotically consistent and which can accommodate unobserved heterogeneity in the 
treatment effect.
11 In this paper, we use the nearest neighbor matching algorithm with bias 
adjustment developed by Abadie and Imbens (2006).  
In making specific choices about the methodology, our approach is to minimize potential 
bias whenever possible. To minimize geographic mismatch, we enforce exact matching by 
township.
12 Each treatment observation is matched to three control observations with 
replacement, which is few enough to enable exact matching by township for nearly all 
observations but enough to reduce the asymptotic efficiency loss significantly (Abadie and 
Imbens, 2006). When we use this method for matching, we report our results as multi-
dimensional matching results to differentiate this approach to matching from the traditional or 
basic matching approach that we also use (and which was described above).  
Matching is based on a set of covariates which are time-invariant or were measured in 
2002. The weighting matrix uses the Mahalanobis metric, which is the inverse of the sample 
variance/covariance matrix of the matching variables. We chose a set of 11 matching variables 
(see Appendix A) for household level matching. Furthermore, we use the propensity scores as a 
diagnostic tool to restrict the sample used in each matching estimation to those with common 
support We also visually examined the graphs of the propensity scores and trimmed the sample if 
there was a large imbalance between control observations and treatment observations with 
similar propensity scores. This approach has been shown to prevent the estimates from relying 
too heavily on just a few control observations.   
  21Results of Multivariate Analysis 
The results of our DD analysis of Models (1) to (4) for the version of the model that uses 
the Any Parent Migrated household variable as the treatment demonstrate that the models 
perform fairly well and are consistent with our intuition (Table 2). For example, when we use the 
Unrestricted and Adjusted specification of the empirical model (column 4), the scores of students 
that are older in the first grade drop relatively more than those of younger students (row 4). This 
finding is reasonable since, ceteris paribus, students that are older when entering elementary 
school may have an initial advantage (because they are relatively more mature) that gradually 
disappears as younger children catch up over the course of elementary school, which is 
consistent with other findings. For example, Fredriksson and Björn (2005) find that children who 
start school at an older age do better in school and go on to have more education than their 
younger peers. Additionally, when a student’s mother has a higher level of education, the 
student’s grades improve relatively more over time. While few papers in the literature have 
examined the impact of the mother’s education on the change of grades, there is a large, related 
literature that shows the strong, positive correlation between mother’s education and the school 
performance of her children (e.g., Duncan and Brooks-Gunn, 1997). Throughout our results, the 
results of the Unrestricted and Adjusted specification has a much higher goodness of fit (or R-
square) statistic, in part reflecting the importance of capturing beginning grades (and the 
unobserved ability of a student that is embodied in this measure) and other covariates. Therefore, 
in the rest of the analysis, while we report the results from Models (1) to (4), we will mostly 
focus on the results from Model (4). 
The most important finding in Table 2 is that we reject the hypothesis that migration 
negatively affects school performance. In all four models the coefficient on the Any Parent 
  22Migrated household treatment variable is not negative (row 1). In fact, the coefficients are all 
positive and significantly different from zero (at least at the 10 percent level—as in column 4). 
The sizes of the coefficients range from 1.16 to 3.18, meaning that, everything else held constant, 
after any parent in a household (that is, father, mother or both parents) outmigrated between the 
first and fifth grade during the student’s elementary school years, the grades of the children of 
the migrants actually rose relatively to the children of Never Migrant households. In other words, 
migration did not hurt school performance as some have feared, at least in the households of the 
migrants in our sample area, migration has improved school performance. 
The same basic results hold when using any other measure of migration; there is no 
negative effect of migration—however defined—on school performance (Table 3). In Table 3 we 
only report the coefficients of the treatment variable (that is, δ). The rest of the results are 
suppressed for brevity but are available from the authors upon request. We report the results for 
24 different regression models. For each of the four specifications (that are in each column) we 
separately look at the impact of migration on school performance using the six different 
measures of migration (or the six different treatment variables, one measure is reported in each 
row).
13 In 20 out of the 24 cases the coefficient is positive. In only four cases (in the cases of 
Mother Migrated Only households (row 4) and Mother Migrated Unconditional households (row 
5) when using the Restricted & Adjusted (column 3) and Unrestricted & Adjusted models 
(column 4)) are the coefficients negative. In each of these four cases, however, the t-ratio is low 
(never more than 0.50), implying that there is no statistically significant effect of migration on 
school performance. Interestingly, as in the case of Any Parent Migrated households (Table 2 and 
Table 3, row 1), when the father outmigrates (in either Father Migrated Only households or 
Father Migrated Unconditional households) the grades of migrant children improve.  
  23So why is it that migration does not appear to have a negative effect on the grades of 
migrant children, and in some cases appears to have a positive effect? Although we can not 
definitively say on the basis of the results of Tables 2 and 3, one possible reason is that the 
income effect is relatively large compared to the adverse effect of less parental supervision. If 
migration leads to higher income, as found in Du and Park (2006), the migrant families that 
experience rising incomes may be able to provide better nutrition, improved access to 
educational supplies and/or require their children to work less and this may have a positive effect 
on school performance. This is consistent with the finding that the largest positive effects among 
all of our models are found among households in which only the father migrates (Table 3, row 2). 
This result may arise since in such households not only would the children benefit from higher 
incomes from migration, they would also suffer relatively less from falling parental care since 
the mother is still at home. Such an interpretation also is consistent with other findings. For 
example, in Kandel and Kao (2001) it is found that when fathers of families migrate from 
Mexico to the US the grades of children in such families improve. 
Alternative Estimation Results 
The results of cross-sectional PSM analysis—regardless of the method of matching—
also reveal that migration has no significant negative effect on the school performance of 
students. When examining the effect of migration on school performance for all six types of New 
Migrant households using Basic Matching methods, there are no cases in which the coefficient 
on the treatment variable is negative and significant (Table 4, column 1, rows 1a, 2a, 3a, 4a, 5a 
and 6a). The same is true when using Multi-dimensional Matching (rows 1b, 2b, 3b, 4b, 5b and 
6b). In fact, the results from the PSM analysis are quite similar to those from the DD analysis. 
Although there are no positive and significant coefficients when we use Basic Matching, when 
  24we use Multi-dimensional Matching (likely the better method) we find that the coefficients on 
the treatment variables in the Father Migrated Only household model and Father Migrated 
Unconditional household model are positive and significant and the magnitudes are similar.  
Finally, the findings continue to remain largely consistent when using Difference in 
Difference Matching (DDM—Table 4, column 2). Regardless if we use Basic Matching (rows 1a, 
2a, 3a, 4a, 5a and 6a) or Multi-dimensional matching (rows 1b, 2b, 3b, 4b, 5b and 6b), none of 
the coefficients of the treatment variables are negative and significant. When using Multi-
dimensional Matching, in the Any Parent, Father Migrated Only and Father Migrated 
Unconditional models, the coefficients are positive and significant. Hence, whether using DD, 
PSM or DDM, there is no evidence that migration in our sample of households has hurt school 
performance. In fact, we find that when the father outmigrates (either by himself or with others), 
migration appears to have a small, positive effect on the school performance of migrant children.  
Heterogeneous effects 
While we have found no significant negative impact of migration on the school 
performance of migrant children, all of these results have been for the average household (that is, 
for the typical migrant households). It is possible, however, that although on average there is no 
effect that there could be a negative effect on certain types of migrant households. In this 
subsection we examine whether or not migration affects households those: a.) are more or less 
wealthy; or b.) have an “only child” or more than one child. To do so, we use a modified 
specification of the basic four models, which are presented in Appendix B. For brevity, we only 
report the results of the Unrestricted & Adjusted, but the results are robust to this specification of 
the model.  
  25Like the results for the average households reported in Tables 2 to 4, the results from DD 
analysis that examines the heterogeneity effects on less and more wealthy households 
demonstrate that there is no significant effect of migration on children from either poorer or 
wealthier households (Table 5, Panel A). The coefficient on the interaction term between the 
dummy variable for the less wealthy households and the migration variable is insignificant for all 
of the types of migrant households except for Any Parent Migrated households (rows 2 to 6). 
This means that there are no significant differences between less and more wealthy households. 
Since in no case is the coefficient on the migration variable negative and significant (in fact, they 
are all positive), this means that in the five cases there is no detectable negative effect for any 
type of household when looking at wealth categories. In the case of Any Parent Migrated 
households, although the coefficient on the interaction term is negative and significant (-2.27—
column 1, row 2), the coefficient on the base migration variable is positive and significant and 
the magnitude is slightly larger (2.40—column 1, row 1). When testing the net impact of 
migration on less wealthy households, we can not reject the hypothesis that the net impact equals 
to zero (2.40 + -2.27 = 0—statistically, that is, we tested Any_Parent_Migrated+ 
Any_Parent_Migrated*Poor = 0). In short, there is no negative effect of migration on the 
children’s school performance in either less or more wealthy households.  
Similar to the results from panel A, the results from DD analysis that examines the 
heterogeneity effects on the grades of children from households with one child and households 
with more than one child reveal that there is no significant different effect (Panel B). The 
coefficient on the interaction term between the dummy variable for One Child households and 
the migration variable is insignificant (rows 1 to 6). Although children with older siblings may 
have significantly higher test scores than their peers (Brown and Park, 2002), when it comes to 
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significant effect.  
Summary and Conclusions 
In this paper we have tried to understand whether or not the school performance of 
children suffer when their parents outmigrate. Despite a perception that is commonly found in 
the literature and the popular press, our results—somewhat surprisingly—show that there is no 
effect of the process of migration itself on the school performance of the children from migrant 
households. Comparing the change over time (between the first and fifth grade) of the grades of 
children from migrant households with those of children from households that did not migrate 
during the study period, we can reject the hypothesis that migration harms the grades of their 
children when their father, mother or both parents migrate from the village into the city. In fact, 
in the analysis of some migrant households (especially in those in which the father outmigrates) 
migration is shown to have a statistically significant and positive effect on the performance of 
migrant children. We also find that there is neither a systematically different effect of migration 
between the children of more wealthy and less wealthy households nor between the children 
from families that have one and more than one child. 
Based on these results, it might be tempting to conclude that since there is no measurable 
effect of migration on school performance that policy maker do no need to take any actions. If 
there was, education officials might want to consider trying to improve the environment in rural 
schools so that that teachers could pay more attention to students in schools in which there were 
many children of migrants. This could be done by reducing class size or hiring more qualified 
teachers. Boarding schools might offer some of the services that parents originally carried out 
before they entered the migrant labor force. Ultimately, measures might be promoted the offered 
  27the children of migrants who lived in China’s cities better access to urban schools so parents 
would not have to leave their children behind. However, all of these programs are expensive. 
And, although there might be good reason to implement such policies anyhow, according to a 
strict reading of our results, they should not be carried out because migration has a negative 
effect on school performance; at least in our study area there is no evidence that this is true.  
Is there any reason to question the validity of our results and question such conclusions? 
Although we have tried a number of alternative approaches to identify the effect of migration, 
and although the findings are largely robust, in fact, we know that some of the assumptions of 
our methodologies may not be perfectly valid in the real world and that the coefficients could be 
measured with a degree of bias. Even though we control for many observed and unobserved 
effects, there still may be factors that are observed by the parents of migrants and potential 
migrants that can not be observed by the econometrician. For example (and most importantly), it 
may be that all parents who were in the village with their children in 2002 worry about whether 
or not their migration decision would negatively affect the school performance of their children. 
If it is the case that those parents who—though having an opportunity to migrate—believed that 
the grades of their children would suffer decided not to migrate, while those that believed their 
children’s grades would not suffer decided to migrate, then our results would be subject to 
selection bias. The measured effect of migration on grades would not only be picking up the 
migration effect.
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If there was, in fact, such a selection bias and we did not account for it (as we were 
unable to—due to the absence of any effective instrumental variable), would our results be 
useless? We believe not. We believe even if there was a selection bias our results are showing 
that when rural parents outmigrate, the grades of their children do not suffer. It is true that part of 
  28the reason for the zero effect may be exactly this selection effect—parents do not go when they 
believe the grades of the children would suffer. But, from society’s point of view, there is no cost 
in terms of school performance of its children due to migration. 
However, one believed that the selection effect was materially important, that does not 
mean that there is no cost to migration and it might call into question the implications of the 
model that we raised above—extensive investments are not needed to improve the mentoring and 
attention that children receive in schools that are attended by migrant families. In fact, it is the 
parents and the family as a whole that is paying the cost. The parent is forgoing a chance to 
outmigrate and forgoing the higher income and other benefits that come from migration. It is 
possible that if schools were restructured in rural areas so that they were more attentive to the 
needs of the children of migrants or in urban areas so that they were more welcoming, migration 
would rise and overall both the families—and society as a whole—would benefit.  
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Figure 1.  Average Yearend Test Scores in China, 2002 and 2006. 
Data source: Authors’ survey  
Note: Scores are averages of sample test scores from standardized test scores for Chinese class; math class and the 















































Figure 2. Differences in Yearend Test Scores between First Grade Students from Migrant and Non-
migrant Households in Rural China, 2006.  
Data source: Authors’ survey  
Notes:  
Never Migrant stands for the students that lived in households in which both parents stayed at home in both 
2002 and 2006. 
Both Parents Migrated, stands for the students that lived in households in which both parents were at home in 
2002, but outmigrated in 2006 
Father Migrated (Unconditional) stands for the students that lived in households in which the father was at 
home in 2002 but outmigrated in 2006 (including households in which the mother was either at home or not at 
home in 2006). 
Mother Migrated (Unconditional) stands for the students that lived in households in which the mother was at 
home in 2002 but outmigrated in 2006 (including households in which the father was either at home or not at 
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Figure 3. Kernel Density Plots of Distributions of Average Test Scores in Households in which 
Parents Never Migrated and in Households in which Both Parents Migrated in China, 2002 and 
2006.  
Data source: Authors’ survey  
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Figure 4. Kernel Density Plots of Distributions of Average Test Scores in Households that Vary by 
Wealth Category and Household Composition in China, 2002 and 2006. 
Data source: Authors’ survey  
Note: Poorer Households are those in the lowest quartile of the sample in terms of self-reported value of the 
family’s house; Wealthier Households are those in the upper quartile. Households with no Siblings are those in 
which the household’s student is an only child; Households with Siblings are those in which the household’s 
student has at least one brother or sister.  36
 
Table 1. Patterns of Migration for Sample Households in China, 2002 and 2006. 
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Data source: Authors’ survey  
 
a Column (1) = Column (2) + Column (3) + Column (4) + Column (5) 
b Total new migrants (or those households in which the parents did not migrate in 2002 and did migrate in 2006) is found in row 4 by summing 
columns 2, 3 and 4).  
c The households in column 5, rows 1, 2 and 3 are return migrants (or those households in which households had a migrant in 2002 and by 2006 
had returned home. These households are dropped from the multivariate analysis. 
d The diagonal elements in the first three rows of the 2006 matrix (row 1, column 2; row 2, column 3; row 3, column 4) are Always Migrant 
households. These households are dropped from the multivariate analysis.
 Table 2. Difference in Difference Regression Results Analyzing the Effect of Migration on School 
Performance of Students in China.
a
Dependent Variable = Changes in Second Term Test Scores between 2002 and 2006 (ΔScore) 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 











b       
(1)  Any_Parent_Migrated  3.183 2.327  2.169  1.164 
   (3.72)***  (3.03)***  (2.58)**  (1.65)* 
Characteristics of the students in 2002        
 -0.460    -0.627  (2)  Student score in the second term in 
2002 (Full score is 100)    (14.93)***    (18.04)*** 
   0.826  -0.383  (3)  Gender dummy (=1 if male and 0 if 
female)     (1.28)  (0.75) 
Age of the student in 2002 (Years)      0.097  -1.322  (4)       (0.26)  (4.39)*** 
   -2.754  1.168  (5)  Cadre dummy (=1 if the student was 
a student cadre in 2002 and 0 if not)      (3.83)***  (1.93)* 
   -1.051  -0.972  (6)  Mentor dummy  (=1 if the student 
had a mentor in 2002)      (0.99)  (1.26) 
   0.438  0.443  (7)  Sibling dummy (=1if the student had 
no siblings in 2002)      (0.55)  (0.71) 
Characteristics of the parents in 2002        
   -0.066  -0.053  (8)  Age of the father  (Years)     (0.85)  (0.85) 
   -0.200  -0.044  (9)  Level of education of the father 
(Years of schooling)      (1.06)  (0.35) 
   0.114  0.274  (10)  Level of education of the mother 
(Years of schooling)      (0.77)  (2.39)** 
Characteristics of the household in 2002        
   0.031  0.037 
(11) 
Size of total household land holding 
in 2002 (mu)      (0.36)  (0.57) 
   0.078  0.251  (12)  Number of household members in 
2002 (Person)      (0.25)  (1.01) 
   0.056  -0.037 
(13) 
House value dummy (=1 if the 
house is worth more than 5000 
yuan)     (0.08)  (0.07) 
(14)  Number of Observations  1575  1575  1549  1549 
(15) R-squared  0.01  0.27  0.10  0.43 
Data source: Authors’ survey. Robust t statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; 
*** significant at 1% 
a The regression models used in this table are the following specifications respectively: 
 (i) Model (1): ΔScorei = α + δMIGi+ εi;          (ii) Model (2): ΔScorei = α +δMIGi + γScore_02i + εi
(iii) Model (3): ΔScorei = α +δMIGi +βXi + εi,         (iv) Model (4):  ΔScorei = α +δMIGi +γScore_02i  +βXi + εi  
Where, i is an index for the student, ΔScorei is the change of the second term score of student i between 2002 and 
2006; MIGi is the treatment variable (so δ is the parameter of interest).  
b In this table the treatment variable MIGi is Any_Parent_ Migrated, a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if both 
parents lived at home in 2002 and at least one parent (either the father; mother or both parents) outmigrated in 2006. 
c The coefficients of the township dummy variables are NOT reported here for the sake of brevity.    
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Table 3. Difference in Difference Regression Results Analyzing the Effect of Migration on School 
Performance of Students in China by Household’s Migration Status 
a
    Dependent Variable = Changes in Second Term Test Scores 
between 2002 and 2006 (ΔScore) 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 
Treatment Variable (MIGi)










3.183 2.327 2.169 1.164  Any_Parent_migrated,  
 (3.72)***  (3.03)***  (2.58)**  (1.65)* 
No. of Observations  1575  1575  1549  1549 
(1) 
R-squared 0.01  0.27  0.10  0.43 
4.634 3.812 3.630 2.356  Father_Migrated_Only 
(mother stayed home)   (4.27)*** (4.09)*** (3.45)*** (2.73)*** 
No. of Observations  1577  1577  1549  1549 
(2) 
R-squared 0.01  0.28  0.10  0.43 
3.812 2.879 2.984 1.508  Father_Migrated 
 (Unconditional)  (4.10)*** (3.52)*** (3.24)***  (1.98)** 
No. of Observations  1595  1595  1551  1551 
(3) 
R-squared 0.01  0.27  0.10  0.43 
0.839 0.156 -0.861  -0.121  Mother_Migrated_Only 
(father stayed home)   (0.45) (0.08) (0.45) (0.07) 
No. of Observations  1576  1576  1549  1549 
(4) 
R-squared 0.00  0.27  0.09  0.43 
0.903 0.444 -0.147  -0.541  Mother_Migrated, 
( Unconditional)  (0.73) (0.37) (0.12) (0.48) 
No. of Observations  1587  1587  1551  1551 
(5) 
R-squared 0.00  0.27  0.09  0.43 
1.367 0.615 1.040 -0.536  Both_parents_migrated, 
  (0.79) (0.38) (0.58) (0.35) 
No. of Observations  1575  1575  1549  1549 
(6) 
R-squared 0.00  0.27  0.09  0.43 
Data source: Authors’ survey. Robust t statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant 
at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
a See Table 2 for specification of regressions.  
b The treatment variable MIGi takes the following six forms:. 
AnyParent_Migrated, which is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if both parents lived at home in 2002 and at least 
one parent (either the father; mother or both parents) outmigrated in 2006. 
Father_Migrated_Only(mother stayed at home) is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if only the father outmigrated 
in 2006 but was at home in 2002; 
Father_Migrated (Unconditional ) is a dummy variable that is equal to1 if the father was at home in 2002 but 
outmigrated in 2006 (including households in which the mother was either at home or not at home in 2006); 
Mother_Migrated_Only(Father stayed at home) is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if only the mother 
outmigrated in 2006 but was at home in 2002; 
Mother_Migrated (Unconditional ) is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the mother was at home in 2002 but 
outmigrated in 2006 (including households in which the father was either at home or not at home in 2006);  
Both_Parents_Migrated is a dummy variable =1 if both parents were at home in 2002, but outmigrated in 2006; 
c The coefficients of the township dummy variables are NOT reported here for the sake of brevity.   39
Table 4. Propensity Score Matching and Multi-dimension Matching Estimators and the Effect of Migration on the School Performance of 
Students in Rural China, 2002 and 2006
 a. 
Propensity Score Matching   
Difference-in-Difference  
Matching  Treatment Variable 
c d   
Average Treatment 
Effect for the Treated
t-value/ 
z-value 
b   Average Treatment 




      (1)    (2) 
(1a) Basic Matching  1.16 (1.02)    0.31 (0.28)  Any_parent_migrated 
  (1b) Multi-dimensional Matching  1.57 (1.60)    2.12 (1.86 )* 
(2a) Basic Matching  2.04 (1.36)    1.12 (0.77)  Father_Migrated_Only 
(mother stayed home)  (2b) Multi-dimensional Matching  3.59 (2.96 ) ***    3.12 (1.93 )** 
(3a) Basic Matching  1.57 (1.20)    2.35 (1.93)**  Father_migrated, 
(Unconditional)  (3b) Multi-dimensional Matching  2.19 (2.04 ) ***    2.52 (1.99 )*** 
(4a) Basic Matching  -0.63 (-0.22)    -1.1 (-0.39)  Mother_Migrated_Only 
(father stayed home)  (4b) Multi-dimensional Matching  -0.94 (-0.43)    1.93 (0.58) 
(5a) Basic Matching  -0.45 (-0.26)    -1.51 (-0.88)  Mother_migrated 
(Unconditional)  (5b) Multi-dimensional Matching  -0.46 (-0.32)    0.82 (0.48) 
(6a) Basic Matching  -0.22 (-0.09)    -0.56 (-0.23) 
Both_parents_migrated 
(6b) Multi-dimensional Matching  -0.28 (-0.13)    0.97 (0.43) 
Data source: Authors’ survey  
a The method of nearest neighbor matching is used to get the Basic Matching results of propensity score matching and multi-dimension matching. 
b t-values and z-values are reported in parentheses. t –values are calculated with the coefficient and standard errors got by Bootstrapping is used to obtain 
standard errors for the basic propensity score matching, and z-values are reported for the multi-dimensional matching. * denotes significant at 10% level, ** 
denotes significant at 5% level, * **denotes significant at 1% level, 
c The covariates, Xi , used in generating the propensity score estimates are the same as those in Table 2.  
d The treatment variables are described in the notes of Table 3. 
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Dependent Variable = Changes in Second Term Test Scores between 2002 and 2006 (ΔScore) 
Panel A 
Heterogeneity Effects from Wealth
a
  Panel B 
Heterogeneity Effects from Household composition
b
Treatment Variable(MIGi)
 a     Treatment Variable(MIGi)
 b    
 
2.397 
   
1.118   
Any_Parent_Migrated 




-2.271    0.195  Any_Parent_Migrated * Poor 
(1.79)*   








(mother stayed home)  (2.83)***   
 
Father_Migrated_Only  
(mother stayed home)  (1.87)* 
-1.170  0.965  Father_Migrated_Only*Poor 









(Unconditional)  (2.85)***   
 
Father_Migrated 
(Unconditional)  (1.60) 
-2.139    0.028  Father_Migrated * Poor 
(1.54)   








(Father stayed home)  (1.59)   
 
Mother_Migrated_Only  
(Father stayed home)  (0.40) 
-3.783  1.680  Mother_Migrated_Only* Poor 









(Unconditional)  (0.99)   
 
Mother_Migrated 
(Unconditional)  (0.29) 
-3.369    -0.174  Mother_Migrated * Poor 




   
0.155   
Both_Parents_Migrated 




-3.982    -1.457  Both_Parents_Migrated * Poor 
(1.38)   
Both_Parents_Migrated* Nosibling 
(0.48) 
Data source: Authors’ survey. Robust t statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 
5%; *** significant at 1% 
a The regression model used in Panel A is ΔScorei = α +δ1MIGi +δ2*MIGi *poor+γScore_02i +βXi + εi, where i is 
the index for the student, MIGi is the treatment variable and it takes six forms (see Table 3 for the definitions of the 
six forms), poor is the housing value dummy in 2002 which equals to 1 if the housing value was worth more than 
5000 in 2002 and 0 otherwise, Score_02i  is the second term score of student i  in 2002  and both δ1 and δ2 are 
reported in column (1). Covariates Xi are the same as those in Table 2.  
b The regression model used in Panel B is ΔScorei = α + δ1MIGi +δ2*MIGi *Nosibling+γScore_02i +βXi + εi, 
where i is the index for the student, MIGi is the treatment variable and it takes six forms (see Table 3 for the 
definitions of the six forms), Nosibling is the sibling dummy in 2002 which equals to 1 if the student had no siblings 
in 2002 and 0 otherwise, Score_02i  is the second term score of student i  in 2002, and both of δ1 and δ2 are reported 
in column (2). Covariates Xi are the same as those in Table 2 except that we exclude a sibling dummy variable. 41
 
Appendix A. Summary Statistics of Control Variables Used in the Multivariate Analysis in Rural China in 2002.  
 
 Control  Variables  Never Migrant  Any Parent Migrated  Total 
   
Characteristics of the students        
(1) Gender dummy(=1 if male and 0 if female)  0.56 (0.50) 0.58 (0.50) 0.55 (0.50) 
(2) Age of students when they were in the first grade   7.86  (0.96)  7.92  (0.92)  7.87  (0.96) 
(3) Cadre dummy (=1 if the student was a student cadre and 0 if not)  0.34  (0.47)  0.30  (0.46)  0.33  (0.47) 
(4) Mentor dummy (=1 if the student had a mentor and  0  otherwise)  0.87 (0.34) 0.87 (0.33) 0.86 (0.35) 
(5) Sibling dummy (=1 if the student had no siblings and 0 otherwise) 0.29  (0.46)  0.38  (0.49)  0.33  (0.47) 
         
  Characteristics of the parents        
(6) Age of the father (Years)  34.74  (4.31)  34.60  (4.30)  34.62  (4.28) 
(7) Education of the father (Years of schooling)  7.80 (2.32) 8.03 (2.73) 7.84 (2.47) 
(8) Education of the mother (Years of schooling)  7.19  (2.66)  7.17  (2.91)  7.15  (2.81) 
          
  Characteristics of the household        
(9) Size of total household land holding (mu)  6.45  (5.01)  5.77  (5.51)  6.17  (5.26) 
(10) Number of household members (Person)  4.58  (1.14)  4.40  (1.20)  4.53  (1.16) 
(11) House value dummy (=1 if the house value is worth more than 
5000 yuan)  0.50 (0.50) 0.56 (0.50) 0.52 (0.50) 
          
Data source: Authors’ survey  
Notes: Mean values are reported in the table with standard deviation in the parenthesis.  
Never Migrant is a household in which both parents stayed at home in both 2002 and 2006. 




 Appendix B 
 




In analyzing the effect of migration, we examine whether or not the impact is different for 
the students of different households. To be specific, we examine the heterogeneous effects from 
wealth and household composition.  
To examine the heterogeneous effects, we estimate the following models: 
Model (5): ΔScorei = α +δ1MIGi +δ2*MIGi *poor+γScore_02i +βXi + εi,  
Model (6): ΔScorei = α +δ1MIGi +δ2*MIGi *nosibling+γScore_02i +βXi + εi,  
where i is the index for the student, MIGi is the treatment variable and it takes six forms
3, poor is 
the housing value dummy in 2002 which equals to 1 if the housing value was worth more than 
5000 in 2002 and 0 otherwise, Nosibling is the sibling dummy in 2002 which equals to 1 if the 
student had no siblings in 2002 and 0 otherwise, Score_02i  is the second term score of student i 
in 2002. δ2 in all the above Models (5) and (6) is the wealth effect and household composition 
effect respectively. We present results of δ1 and δ2 for the above specifications in table 5. 
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Endnotes 
 
                                                        
1 In the case of the students that were held back, we recorded the grades of the first grade year, which unless 
the child had only been held back for first grade year, was prior to the 2001/2002 academic year. Although we 
have not included a control for “held back” in our model in this paper, in an alternative version of the model 
(not shown for brevity), we included such a variable and there was no effect on our results. 
2 Finally, we also included information in the survey to control for other observed factors that might be 
expected to affect school performance (that can be used as control variables). Three sets of variables were 
collected. In a set of questions about the characteristics of each student we collected information about each 
student’s gender, age, the number of times that they were held back by a grade, and asked them whether or not 
they were student cadres. The survey form also included questions on the characteristics of each student’s 
parents and family. The data set includes variables on each parent’s age and education attainment as well as the 
household’s land holdings and the total number of other household members. 
3 Yuan is the Chinese currency. One dollar is about 7.6 yuan. 
4 Since we count the migration activities of the parents of these children as treatments before the period of 
study, these households are not included in the study. 
5 The term, wealth, when used in the rest of the paper will refer to the value of housing assets only. 
6 Other studies in China have found that there is no significant effect of household composition on grades. 
7 In fact, the migrant households can be any one of the six types of migrant households or treatment groups. 
8 We need to note, however, that a recent study found that the propensity score matching method is sensitive to 
the covariates used to estimate the scores and that combination of matching with DD was superior (Smith and 
Todd 2004). We account for this comment below. 
9 The results are available upon request. 
10 Using outcomes from experimental data as a benchmark, Smith and Todd (2004) found that DDM 
performed better than DD or PSM methods. 
11 In another paper, they show that boostrapping is inappropriate for estimating standard errors for matching 
methods with a fixed number of matches (Abadie and Imbens, 2005). 
12 This is accomplished by assigning an arbitrarily high weight to the exact matching variable in defining the 
matching criteria. 
13 For completeness in Table 3, we include the results of the effect of Any Parent Migrated on school 
performance, but, in fact, this is a duplication of the results from Table 2, row 1. 
14 It is important to note that according to the theory, PSM and DDM are designed to account for at least part 
of the unobserved heterogeneity that might be causing any selection bias, so, in fact, it can be argued that we 
have addressed this concern. Moreover, although we raise this issue because it theoretically is possible, in fact, 
there is reason to believe it is not that serious of a statistical problem. We believe this because this is only a 
problem when parents will only choose NOT to migrate if the cost of lower grades is higher than the benefits 
of migrations. We do not believe this is true in general. As the cost of lower grades FOR PARENTS is going to 
show only in the future—in our case 5 to 10 years later when these children enter the job market and the 
benefits of migration, on the other hand, accrue to the family immediately. Taking into account that the 
discount rate for individuals in developing countries is generally quite high, it is reasonable to say that lower 
grades will not stop most parents from migrating. 
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